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THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
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v. : 
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Defendant/ Appellant. : 
SUMMARY 
To properly exercise its discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude 
expert testimony regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification, a trial court must 
evaluate the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Analysis of the particular 
factors of the case is necessary to show that the trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony was guided by case law that has avoided per se rules of admissibility or 
inadmissibility. Some important factors to be considered by trial courts in determining 
whether to admit or exclude expert testimony include the nature of the testimony offered 
by the expert, whether the expert testimony addresses the specific facts of the case, the 
circumstances surrounding the eyewitness testimony, the presence of the factors testified 
to by the expert affecting identification, the background of the jurors, and other relevant 
information about jurors. A proper evaluation of the factors existing in this case where 
the accuracy of the eyewitnesses' testimony was the central issue, would have resulted in 
the admission of Dr. Dodds' testimony as necessary to assist the jury in understanding the 
evidence and reaching a correct decision. 
POINT. A TRIAL COURT ABUSES ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILS 
TO PROPERLY EVALUATE THE PARTICULAR FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE IN DETERMINING WHETHER 
EXPERT TESTIMONY WOULD ASSIST THE JURY IN MAKING A 
CORRECT DECISION. 
It is well established that a trial court "has wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1f72, 63 P.3d 621; 
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^ [14, 48 P.3d 953. However, rules, statutes and case law 
exist to help guide and instruct a trial court in exercising its discretion properly. A trial 
court abuses its discretion if rather than using the law to guide its decision making 
process, it simply uses it as a mechanism to exclude expert testimony and bypass a 
careful analysis of the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Contrary to the 
state's assertions, Brink does not advocate a per se rule of admissibility of expert 
testimony regarding eyewitness identification. Rather, Brink argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it failed to properly evaluate the particular facts and 
circumstances of this case before excluding the expert's testimony. 
To properly exercise its discretion, a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony must be made on a case-by-case basis after thoroughly considering the 
particular facts and circumstances of the case. Under the state's theory, a trial court could 
never be found to have abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification, regardless of whether the testimony would assist the trier of fact in 
evaluating the accuracy of the identifications, so far as it gives the mandated Long 
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instruction to the jury. See Appellee Brief 18-20; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 
1986). However, even where a Long instruction is given, expert testimony may still be 
necessary to adequately assist the jury in making a correct decision. The fundamental 
problem with the argument that a Long instruction is always sufficient in lieu of expert 
testimony is that it is based on the faulty premise that expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identification is within the common knowledge of the jury. As Long noted, 
research indicates that the average juror is unaware of the problems regarding the 
fallibility of eyewitness identifications. Long, 721 P.2d at 490. Human perception and 
memory are complicated and "juries have a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
reliability of eyewitness identification" believing their common sense is enough to weigh 
the accuracy of the testimony even though their common knowledge is often 
counterintuitive. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32,H26, 984 P.2d 376. 
The state's theory highlights Brinks' argument regarding the trial court's failure to 
properly consider the facts and circumstances of this case in determining whether Dr. 
Dodds' testimony was necessary for the jury to properly weigh the accuracy of the 
eyewitness identifications. While the state supports it argument by citing to such things 
as the dilemma of dueling experts noted by the supreme court in Hubbard and the risk 
that the jury would defer its judgment to the expert, such dilemmas and risks exist 
essentially every time expert testimony is offered by opposing sides at trial. Appellee 
Brief 16; Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^ 15. While it is true that use of expert testimony could 
lead to dueling experts regarding the accuracy of eyewitness identification, "[g]iven the 
high stakes in criminal cases and the proven ability of judges to tailor issues and limit 
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witnesses, a little extra time does not seem wasteful even if expert witnesses are 
competing for the jury's attention." Warren D. Wolfson, 'That's the Man!" Well Maybe 
Not: The Case for Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony, 26 No. 2 Litig. 5, 8 
(2000). 
Furthermore, the argument concerning risks that an expert's testimony will usurp 
the jury's task of weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony is unfounded as Utah 
Rule of Evidence 704 essentially does away with such an argument. Rule 704 states 
"testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." 
Utah R. Evid. 704; see also Wolfson, supra, at 8. Expert witnesses do not endeavor to 
tell jurors whether a particular witness's identification is actually accurate or not. 
Instead, the experts provide scientific information about the human memory 
process, analyze how it is shaped and affected, and explain factors that fit 
the important evidence. Jurors are left to decide whether and how the 
information applies to their judgments of eyewitness credibility. That is not 
usurpation. That is assistance. 
Wolfson, supra. As with other witnesses, jurors are completely capable of evaluating the 
testimony of an expert witness and rejecting it after weighing the expert's opinion on the 
factors that affect the accuracy of the memory process. 
Despite the state's assumption to the contrary, prior case law from the Supreme 
Court affirming the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification should not be viewed as a rubber stamp on every trial court's decision to 
exclude expert testimony. Such a reading of the case law creates the very thing the 
Supreme Court was determined to avoid, a per se rule of inadmissibility. Hubbard, 2002 
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UT 45 at [^14 (Utah has "not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony 
regarding eyewitness identification^]"). Instead, circumstances exist where expert 
testimony can and will assist a jury in reaching a correct decision. This Court should 
ensure that a trial court's decision to exclude an expert's testimony has been based on 
sound analysis stemming from the particular facts and circumstances of the case and 
guided by case law. Some of the relevant factors that are critical for the trial court to 
consider in determining whether admitting expert testimony "will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," are (1) the testimony offered by 
the expert, (2) whether it addresses the specific facts of the case, (3) the circumstances 
surrounding the eyewitnesses testimony, (4) the presence of the factors testified by the 
expert affecting identification, (5) the background of jurors, and (6) other relevant 
information about jurors that would aid in determining whether the testimony would meet 
the helpfulness standard. 
A trial court does not properly exercise its discretion simply by citing key phrases 
from appellate case law without analysis regarding its application to the case. In granting 
the state's motion to exclude Dr. Dodds' testimony, the court failed to include any 
analysis that explains its decision of the factors that led to its determination that Dr. 
Dodds' testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury. Analysis of the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case is necessary to show that the trial court properly exercised 
its discretion rather than blindly excluding expert testimony knowing that its decision 
would not be overturned. Such scrutiny of a case is especially critical where eyewitness 
identification is key in linking the defendant to the criminal offense. 
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Expert testimony on eyewitness testimony would have assisted the jury in this 
case. Brink's defense was that the witnesses had mistaken him for Jeff Crisp who is 
similar in age, build and has similar facial features. Therefore, accuracy of the 
eyewitness's identification was the central issue in the case. The testimony that Dr. 
Dodds would have offered to the jury related directly to the facts and circumstances 
particular to this case. Dr. Dodds' testimony would have been helpful to the jury in 
weighing potential problems which were associated with the accuracy of the witnesses' 
identification testimony without directly commenting on the witnesses' credibility. Dr. 
Dodds' testimony would have been especially beneficial to the jury when considering 
Martucci's testimony that she became increasingly more certain of Brink's identity as the 
robber each time she saw him in court as well as the evidence that Warnock was not able 
to identify Brink until trial. Given these and other factors more fully discussed in 
Appellant's opening brief, exclusion of the expert's testimony likely had "a substantial 
influence in bringing about a different verdict." State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^[43, 27 
P.3d 1133 (citations omitted). 
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to properly analyze the 
facts and circumstances of this case in determining whether Dr. Dodds' testimony would 
have assisted them in making a correct decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and more fully set out in Appellant's opening brief, 
Brink respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for aggravated robbery. 
SUBMITTED this 7~"1 day of September, 2007. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
JOHN WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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